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Technology and Childhood
On a Double Debt of the Human
by
Gert-Jan van der Heiden (Radboud University)
If we raise the question of humanism today, we encounter a number of pre-
fixes indicating that we are moving away from humanism. Prefixes such as 
anti-, post-, and trans- (and we may perhaps also add the prefix in- as in the 
inhuman) determine a large number of the reflections on humanism today, 
and especially those reflections indebted to Martin Heidegger’s Letter on 
Humanism. For Heidegger, it is the definition of the human being as animal 
rationale that is the point of departure for humanism and that, therefore, marks 
the problematic status of humanism since the human is more than this defini-
tion allows us to think: Das Wesen des Menschen besteht aber darin, daß er mehr 
ist als der bloße Mensch, insofern dieser als das vernünftige Lebewesen vorgestellt wird.1
This latter sentence also exemplifies the problem we encounter when 
trying to “overcome” humanism: although the sense of what is human as 
developed in humanism and metaphysics is criticized, it is done so in light 
of another sense of the human, here described as the essence of the human 
being (das Wesen des Menschen). It is for this reason that Heidegger briefly 
plays with the idea whether this other sense of the human may not guide a 
reinterpretation of the word “humanism” and whether it is not possible dem 
Wort Humanismus einen geschichtlichen Sinn zurückzugeben, der älter ist als sein 
historisch gerechnet ältester.2 Yet, he dismisses this option since it would give 
rise to einen “Humanismus” seltsamer Art, a too singular “humanism”.3 In-
stead, he suggests durch einen offenen Widerstand gegen den ‚Humanismus‘ einen 
1 Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe Band 9, Frankfurt am Main 1976, 
p. 342.
2 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 345.
3 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 345.
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Anstoß zu wagen.4 I will take the two words he uses in this sentence, Anstoß 
and wagen, as the guideline to a reflection on what, after Heidegger and in 
the wake of Heidegger’s critique of humanism, a reflection on the human 
may have in store for us. The word Anstoß means both offense and thrust 
or push, an ambiguity which in the English translation is captured by the 
word “shock”, and it is this Anstoß that thinking has to risk in its reflection 
on the essence of the human being.
In his subsequent account of the nature of this reflection, Heidegger 
seems to suggest that this ambiguity of the shock one needs to risk in think-
ing the human is regulated by a clear economy. On the one hand, there are 
simple “misinterpretations” (Mißdeutungen) of the nature of this reflection 
that mistake the open resistance to humanism for eine Verteidigung des In-
humanen und eine Verherrlichung der barbarischen Brutalität.5 This, so it seems 
in these pages of the Letter on “Humanism”, is the offense this reflection 
may cause: a defense of the inhuman, of a certain form of inhumanity that 
is further explicated by the word “barbaric”, which is derived from the 
Greek βάρβαρος, the crude human being who does not possess the Greek 
λόγος. Yet, as he insists, this is a mere misinterpretation of the nature of this 
reflection. On the other hand, Heidegger argues that this resistance allows 
for the shock that pushes thinking into eine Besinnung […] die […] auf die 
Dimension denkt, in der das Wesen des Menschen, vom Sein her bestimmt, heimisch 
ist.6 Hence, the non-misunderstanding, the proper understanding of this 
reflection arises when we see that this other thought of the human enters a 
zone in which the essence of the human being is at home. Thinking requires 
such a shock that allows it to enter a realm that shelters the essence of the 
human and that is proper to the human being.
In what follows, I will show how the very ambiguity of both the Anstoß 
and the Wagnis marks the reflections on the human after Heidegger, but 
I will add that this ambiguity is not regulated by the economy Heidegger 
imposes on it. To a certain extent, this problematization of the aforemen-
tioned economy is already at work in Heidegger’s thought: when the 
human being is to be understood neither as animal rationale nor as ζῷον 
λόγον ἔχον, the “essence” of the human will have to involve the ele-
ment of the barbaric, of the βάρβαρος, of what lacks a Greek λόγος. The 
Anstoß is in the first place an offence to the dignity of the human being 
that is found in human rationality, in human having language, both from 
4 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 346. For the English translation see Martin Heideg-
ger, Pathmarks, edited by William McNeill, Cambridge/New York 1998, p. 263.
5 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 346.
6 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 346.
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18 Gert-Jan van der Heiden 
a theoretical and a practical concern, i. e. both in the human capacity to 
discern in science and technology the blossoming of its humanity as well 
as in the human capacity to speak and to act. In addition, one needs to 
think how this λόγος then comes to supplement this barbaric dimension 
of the human. It also remains to be seen to what extent this element of the 
βάρβαρος can be understood in terms of “brutality”, which is of the brute, 
the animal, and more specifically the powers the animals demonstrate and 
that in the word brutality comes to mean a certain cruel and crude abuse 
of powers. (In this latter sense, animality and brutality have lost their kin-
ship since only the human being seems to be able to demonstrate brutality 
in its exemplary form.)
To elaborate these lines of thought, I want to trace two developments, 
arising in discussion with Heidegger’s concerns with respect to humanism, 
that each in its own way adopts Heidegger’s challenge and shows how the 
ambiguity of the Anstoß and the Wagnis do return in an understanding of 
the human (and in the inhuman). This ambiguity will be explained in terms 
of a double provenance or a double debt of the human which renders the 
human, from its very origin, double faced. I will elaborate this claim in dis-
cussion with two authors (although others could have been chosen), namely 
Bernard Stiegler, a prolific student of Jacques Derrida who concentrates on 
the problem of technology, and Jean-François Lyotard and his reflections 
on enfance or childhood. I’ve chosen these two since their works on the 
human and the double debt of the human are in a precise sense of the word 
complementary, as I aim to show in what follows.
1. Τέχνη and the Birth of Humankind
The themes of anti-humanism, post-humanism or trans-humanism often 
include reflections on the role of science and technology for the constitu-
tion of the human being. In particular, these non-humanisms often aim to 
understand the end of the human being brought about by technology: the 
human is taken up in a thoroughly technological process that substitutes 
or ends the human. Stiegler’s work on technics and technology departs 
from this present-day interest in the end of the human. Yet, as he argues, 
rather than merely considering the implications and presuppositions of this 
thought of the ends of the human, one should first inquire into the consti-
tutive relation between humans and technics – a relation that precedes the 
birth of the human, as Stiegler notes when characterizing the central tenet 
of his work:
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We are considering a passage: the passage to what is called the human. Its “birth,” if there 
is one. Why should we question the “birth” of the human? First of all because we have 
unceasingly, since Hegel, questioned its end.7
Hence, according to Stiegler, a proper analysis of the end(s) of the human 
should be supported by and understood out of a conception of the beginning 
of the human, the very birth of humankind. The story of the birth of hu-
mankind is a story of technics or technology. In the first volume of Technics 
and Time, Stiegler offers the philosophical framework for this story, which 
he also finds exemplified in the story of the birth of humankind as told in 
Plato’s Protagoras.8 The main thesis of Technics and Time can be phrased in 
terms of this story, as is also indicated by this book’s subtitle: The Fault of 
Epimetheus. Let me first retell this story in my own register and subsequently 
turn to Stiegler’s understanding of it.
Protagoras narrates the fable of the creation of mortal beings. After the 
gods have molded the mortal beings in earth (but before these beings are 
brought to light), they assign Prometheus and Epimetheus with a particu-
lar task, namely to give to each species the particular powers or capacities 
(δύναμις) that belong to them so that they are able to survive. One might 
interpret the necessity of this task as follows: apparently, each of these mor-
tal beings has an innate care for its own being, and it is the task of the two 
titans to grant to these beings the powers proper to their survival and their 
safeguarding – and this means the powers that are proper for them to their 
take care of their own being, otherwise they are left powerless.
Epimetheus asks Prometheus whether he, Epimetheus, can do the deal-
ing himself so that Prometheus can check afterwards whether the capacities 
were distributed well. When handing out the capacities to each of the spe-
cies, Epimetheus forgets one of them: humankind. “Now Epimetheus […] 
heedlessly squandered his stock of properties on the brutes; he had still left 
unequipped the race of men, and was at a loss what to do with it”9 Although 
the day of their emergence from the earth – their being brought to light, 
their birth – had already come, humankind did not yet receive any powers 
to care for its own being. At this point, the story marks a fundamental differ-
ence between the human and the brutes, the ἄλογα, in that the former lacks 
7 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, translated by 
Richard Beardsworth and George Collins, Stanford 1998, p. 135.
8 Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, pp. 183–203. Plato, Protagoras 320 c–322 d. Pro-
tagoras offers the choice of a μῦθος or a λόγος, and since everybody urges him to proceed 
in the way he pleases, he notes that probably the more agreeable way is to tell the story 
(320 c).
9 Plato, Protagoras, 321 c.
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any proper powers for sustaining its life. The fault (faute) of Epimetheus thus 
constitutes the original lack or defect (défaut) of the human being.
When Prometheus comes and examines how Epimetheus fulfilled the 
task assigned to them, he finds the brutes well taken care of, but the humans 
“naked, unshod, unbedded, unarmed”. It is as if with these words, the story 
describes the human at its birth: naked, without protection, without natural 
resting place, without any powers or capacities to safeguard its existence. 
Prometheus finds himself in perplexity, ἁπορία, of what powers may serve as 
preservation or salvation, σωτηρίαν, of humankind.10 The human thus con-
fronts the titan with a second task, namely to compensate for Epimetheus’ 
fault and to supplement human powerlessness. The fulfillment of this sec-
ond task, as Stiegler points out, gives rise to the second fault at the heart of 
human existence: to offer humans the means to protect and save themselves, 
Prometheus steals fire and arts (τέχνη) from Hephaistos and Athena and 
gives them to the humans; this Prometheus εὐπορία out of the ἁπορία in 
which he finds himself.11 Whereas the brutes are the ἄλογα, it is thanks to 
the skills and arts received from Prometheus that humankind develops φωνή 
and ὀνόματα, voice and words, that is, language. Language as the defining 
characteristic of humankind is thus due to the divine arts granted to hu-
mans and is not proper to human – once again, one may interpret this as a 
description of human childhood: none of the human languages are naturally 
given, but the child has to develop its voice and its words and usually learns, 
in time, to speak one or some of the many human languages that exist.
The divine arts that supplement the lack of proper human powers or abili-
ties constitutes the ambiguity and the particular risk of the human: naked, 
but clothing itself with divine means and offered the gift of fire that gives 
wealth, it can also destroy the very civilization it helped to build up. It is in 
light of this risk at stake in the arts that Prometheus stole for the humans 
that Zeus assigns Hermes with the task of giving to all humans another 
supplement and another τέχνη, namely the civic or political art, πολιτική 
τέχνη12. It is only by the gifts of δίκη and αἰδώς that humans may negoti-
ate with the dangers of the arts in the complexity of civic and social life, 
allowing humans to constitute communities and political bonds which they 
need for their survival.
What does this story mean for Stiegler? According to him, it basically 
tells us that humankind depends on technics and technology from before its 
birth – the supplementary structure of the human marks that humankind is 
10 Plato, Protagoras, 321 c–d.
11 Plato, Protagoras, 322 a.
12 Plato, Protagoras, 322 c–d.
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not its own but is rather a product, produced by and constituted by technics. 
It is in this sense that terms such as post-humanism are premature since if the 
human of humanism is understood as a human before any contamination 
or supplementation with technics, humanism simply does not exist: from 
its very inception, humankind depends on technics. One might perhaps say 
that at this point Stiegler restates Hannah Arendt’s famous description of the 
human being as a conditioned being, privileging the condition of technics:
Men are conditioned beings because everything they come in contact with turns im-
mediately into a condition of their existence. […] Whatever touches or enters into a 
sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the character of a condition 
of human existence.13
According to Stiegler, this conditioned nature of the human extends also 
to the human capacity to speak and to act: these capacities are not simply, 
originally or properly human but depend on the gift of arts and fire, on 
those skills that allowed the human to develop voice and words. This means 
that they are capacities that are not simply granted to humans from the very 
beginning, but need to be developed, need to be taught, and require the 
very human institutions in which they subsequently appear. In this sense, 
even the voice of an individual is not simply something utterly new, but 
always marked by the shared language into which the child is introduced 
by his or her education.
Departing from this basic insight, a whole field of philosophical inquiries 
into the role and importance of technology for the human opens up. It is 
not my aim to go into that direction but rather to use this form of non-hu-
manism (which in certain way is exemplary for the forms of non-humanism 
that nowadays arise out of a philosophical reflection on technology and its 
societal role) in order to outline the understanding of the human to which 
Stiegler’s reading guides him.
The description of the human as an animal with τέχνη is, at first sight, 
not in itself at odds with the definition of the human as animal rationale or 
ζῷον λόγον ἔχον. After all, the human voice (φωνή) and the human words 
(ὀνόματα) are understood as the first consequences of the skills (τέχνη) 
granted to the human. In this sense, λόγος does name the singularity of the 
human amidst the other mortal creatures (who are the ἄλογα).14 Yet, to un-
derstand how Stiegler puts this classical understanding of the human upside 
down, it is important to hear the Derridean key in which he reads these 
passages when emphasizing the supplementary character of technology. None 
of the creatures are finished when being molded in earth. Yet, whereas the 
13 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago 1998, p. 9.
14 Plato, Protagoras 321 c; see Stiegler, Time and Technics, 1, p. 195.
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incompleteness of the other mortal creatures is completed by powers that 
befit mortal creatures – having fur to protect them from the cold, having 
the capacity to outrun their natural opponents, having the strength to gather 
their food, and so on; all these powers are in accordance with the divine 
process of passing out mortal capacities to the mortals – the incompleteness 
of the humans is not completed but rather supplemented by arts powers 
that only befit the immortals. Therefore, the incompleteness of the molded 
forms – the pre-human forms that will be brought to existence – gets a dif-
ferent meaning in the human being: it becomes, in Stiegler’s formulation, a 
défaut, a lack or defect. Rather than accounting for this lack as a mere lack, 
a mere void it might be more telling to understand this lack in terms of a 
desire or a propensity: the human is the being that desires possibilities, poten-
tialities, powers, and capacities and moves towards gaining them (the whole 
range of meanings of the Greek δύναμις may be brought into play here).15 
This means also that the human is, from its birth, in a struggle to attain 
powers and is in a certain sense powerless; therefore, it requires the arts that 
allow the human, by means of a supplement to and never by a fulfillment 
of this desire, to acquire certain powers and capacities.16 Thus, the birth of 
the human involves a twofold non-human: a lack as a desire for capacities 
and the stolen, divine arts that supplement this lack. Since the supplement 
does not complete or fulfill this desire, humankind derives from a mismatch: 
harmony between the two non-human parts can never be attained.
On the one hand, the divine arts stretch the human beyond itself. As 
Stiegler argues, following Jacques Derrida, they are characteristically a 
φάρμακον: a gift and a medicine for the human being as well as a possible 
poison or threat to human; as he notes with regard to Prometheus’ gift of 
fire: “Fire is the pharmakon par excellence. As civilizing process, it is con-
stantly at risk of setting fire to civilization.”17 Or, in the terminology used in 
Technics and Time 1, the τέχναι are supplements, and they are constitutive of 
λόγος. Hence, in this reading, the notion of τέχνη complicates the defini-
tion of the human by indicating a certain rift between ζωή and λόγος. The 
supplement, which is a φάρμακον, constitutes the risk that the human is – a 
15 This particular comment moves beyond Stiegler’s account since for him the structure 
of desire in the human is also constituted and directed by technics.
16 One might be inclined to add here a reflection on Plato’s use of παιδεία which 
always requires another for the education – even in the parable of the cave, the ability 
to get out of the cave is not natural or innate but requires the help of those who went 
outside before.
17 For the importance of the pharmakon and of technology as pharmacology, see e. g. 
Bernard Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living, On Pharmacology, Polity Press 
2013, p. 24.
Authors e-offprint with publisher’s permission.
23Technology and Childhood
risk both the titans and the gods are willing to take since it seems to be the 
only way to grant humankind the powers to survive. In this sense, the sup-
plement is both the human risk and the human chance.
On the other hand, to prepare turning to Lyotard, the human lack is con-
stitutive of the human precisely because the powers granted to the human 
are not completing the human but, as supplement, leave a certain room for 
play or for différance between the folded molded in earth and the powers or 
capacities awarded to it to survive. This human void, lack or defect (défaut) 
is, as Stiegler shows in a repetition of an argument of Derrida’s, only trace-
able; it is only given in the traces it leaves: the constitutive lack can only be 
touched in and by a certain technical, grammatical mediation. In terms of 
the myth, one could say that this void or defect is the very human weak-
ness that manifests itself as the incapacity to persist in existence: the human 
“was naked, unshod, unbedded, unarmed”.18 Yet is it enough to describe 
this constitutive, human weakness as a lack, as something taken up by and 
in the process of supplementation? Is there not a more basic meaning to 
be granted to the constitutive weakness of human birth? Put differently, if 
humankind borrows the capacities of the gods, what happens to its own, 
pre-human incapacity that it carries in itself and that is the very condition 
of its particular birth?19 It is at this point that I would like to bring another 
perspective into play, one which in certain respects doubles the problematic 
of Stiegler, with, perhaps, less attention to the different layers of technical 
supplementarity, but also with a keener sense for the meaning of this human 
incapacity itself, for that which in the human precedes the human λόγος, 
the human voice and human words.
2. Enfance or the Human that Cannot Speak
The work of Lyotard offers a different interpretation of the ambiguity of 
the human, i. e., the twofold dimension of the non-human that constitutes 
the human being as we discussed it above. It is especially the dimension of 
the constitutive defect of the human – that which needs to be repaired and 
18 Plato, Protagoras, 321 c.
19 Note that in Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought among the Greeks, New 
York 2006, p. 266, it is mentioned that Prometheus’ theft introduces birth through pro-
creation. The figure of Prometheus, of course, is often referred to in relation to the human 
capacities of technology and the implied mastery of the world. One might understand 
Stiegler’s reinterpretation of the story of Prometheus in line with a certain suspicion 
with respect to the gift of technology. For a clear overview of the different aspects of the 
Prometheus-myth, see Samuel IJsseling, Apollo, Dionysos, Aphrodite en de anderen, 
Amsterdam 1999, pp. 149–173.
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supplemented by τέχνη, as Stiegler suggests – that is the point of departure 
for Lyotard’s critique of humanism. To understand what happens in the 
transition from Stiegler to Lyotard, one should first account for the particu-
lar change of perspective that takes place in this transition, and this change 
concerns first and foremost the role of technics and technology. Whereas 
Stiegler addresses this theme in the context of the above considerations on 
the birth of humankind to understand the basic and primary relation of 
technics to humanity, Lyotard addresses this theme in relation to the ques-
tion of the role of technology and the institutions in society today, i. e., the 
time and period that has given rise to thinking the end or the ends of hu-
mankind. And, as one should immediately add, it is not only Lyotard but also 
Stiegler, in other texts and contexts, who offers an intriguing and pressing 
analysis of the role of technology in society today. In fact, when it comes to 
this present-day role of technology, there is a fundamental agreement be-
tween Stiegler and Lyotard concerning one aspect of the complexity of the 
contemporary world. Despite Stiegler’s insistence on the technical “nature” 
of the human – the indispensable prosthesis or supplement of τέχνη for the 
human – the technological developments in present-day society are of such 
an enormous speed that humans and human institutions lack the capacity 
to reflect these developments in the societal structure and thus to find a 
proper way of dealing with these developments. The speed of these tech-
nological developments, as Stiegler argues, leads to a fundamental societal 
disorientation or disaster due to “an illimitation of technics, in which the 
nature of humanity is thereby threatened by its own power qua technics”.20 
In this period, the φάρμακον of technics shows its poisonous side more 
clearly than ever: what saved human existence at its birth according to the 
Platonic myth, now threatens this existence. More than ever, to put it in 
different terms, technics and technology as well as the way they inform and 
structure society, have a dehumanizing effect. In this way, they produce an-
other offence to the human, one might say. If one follows Stiegler’s analysis 
at these points, we see that the Anstoß and the fear of barbaric brutalities of 
which Heidegger speaks, might indeed belong to the nature of the human, 
especially the human as the being whose essence is to risk and to be a risk 
exactly in his relation to τέχνη.
Unlike Stiegler, who offers an analysis not only of technology in terms of 
its present-day disorienting effect but also of the intrinsic connectedness of 
humanity to technology, Lyotard’s reflections depart from the current state 
of affairs. In the highly intriguing introductory chapter of the book entitled 
The Inhuman (an introduction which perhaps tells us more about the inhu-
20 Cf. Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, p. 92.
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man than the rest of the book), Lyotard writes that the essays collected in 
this volume “betray” a particular “suspicion” that, as he writes,
is simple, though double: what if human beings, in humanism’s sense, were in the process 
of, constrained into, becoming inhuman (that’s the first part)? And (the second part), what 
if what is “proper” to humankind were to be inhabited by the inhuman?21
In this dense quote, Lyotard distinguishes two forms of inhuman (to which 
also two forms of the human or of humanity correspond, as we shall see). 
The first form of the inhuman, namely the one human beings are “becom-
ing,” is Lyotard’s version of what Stiegler refers to by the words “disorienta-
tion” and “disaster”. If one follows the terminology and the references these 
two authors offer, it is immediately clear that in both cases, Heidegger’s 
reflections on technology and Gestell are a fundamental source of inspiration 
to them (e. g., Stiegler writes that “technics [is] understood today as “sys-
tem”, […] Gestell”), but also the influence of Maurice Blanchot elucidates 
the similar gesture one finds in the works of these authors. Stiegler refers to 
Blanchot when speaking of the “becoming-astral” of the human, which in 
fact is nothing but Blanchot’s version of Lyotard’s “becoming inhuman”.22 
Blanchot’s explication of his reference to the stars (in the becoming-astral 
and the “astral era”) also resonates with Heidegger’s reflections on technol-
ogy. Consider the following words by Blanchot:
For the latter [i. e., modern technology] includes collective organization on a planetary 
scale for the purpose of establishing calculated planning, mechanization and automation, 
and, finally, atomic energy – a key term. What up to now only the stars could do, man 
does.23
What at first may sound as an exaltation of the human – humankind has 
become like the stars – turns out to be an unlimited multiplication of the 
risk that the human presents. Moreover – or perhaps by consequence – this 
becoming-a-star leads to a dehumanization of the world brought about by 
the powers that were first given to the human for survival.
Confronted with such an account – and the doom scenarios of which 
they seem to be composed – the question arises of where an alternative is 
to be found; which of the human powers is capable of offering a way out 
of these scenarios. It is at this point that the analyses of Stiegler and Lyotard 
go separate ways – at least up to a certain degree, as I will explain below. In 
his recent What Makes Life Worth Living, it becomes clear how Stiegler will 
21 Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, tr. by Geoffrey Ben-
nington and Rachel Bowlby, Cambridge 1998, p. 2.
22 Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, pp. 91–92.
23 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, tr. by Susan Hanson, Minneapolis, 
MN 1992, p. 266. See also Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, p. 89.
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attempt to solve this contemporary crisis of technology – or rather where 
he finds the possible resources of such a solution. These resources are found 
in the very pharmacological nature of technics. Whereas contemporary 
developments in technology show stronger than ever before the poisonous 
side of the φάρμακον that τέχνη is, this does not efface its medicinal side. 
One might say that technics becomes differentiated in itself and that tech-
nics need to be developed that supplement the disorienting technics (which 
dehumanize and which offer no place for a human life and relation to it) 
and that will form the medium for a societal transition towards a situation 
in which the new technical developments offer a space to live in. Stiegler 
opts here for a differentation of the τέχναι that runs parallel to the one an-
nounced in the Platonic myth: the stolen arts and fire do not lead to human 
survival, but rather to humans doing wrong to other humans and thus to the 
further dissolution of humankind,24 therefore Zeus offers another τέχνη, the 
πολιτική τέχνη, to moderate the disastrous effects of the stolen arts so that 
humankind can take care of itself. When Stiegler argues that it is technics 
itself that should find the means to live with the newly developed technics, 
he brings into play a similar πολιτική τέχνη which extends to a πόλις in 
which one learns how to live with technics. Although this differentiation is 
inescapable – if human powers are the only resource to deal with the diso-
rientation, the only possible way out of this disorientation is to be found 
in technics – it is at the same time highly doubtful whether one can truly 
think such a differentiation in terms of the Derridean notion of φάρμακον: 
after all, this notion implies that the poisonous dimension itself cannot be 
separated from its medicinal dimension. To put it differently, for Derrida, 
the notion of φάρμακον was introduced to problematize the distinction 
between good and bad writing, whereas Stiegler uses the same notion to 
distinguish between good and bad technics, disorienting and orienting 
technologies, threatening and saving technics.25 Therefore, it remains to be 
seen whether Stiegler’s approach here does not require another source to 
account for this differentiation.26
With regard to this aporia, Lyotard offers another passageway out. Recall 
that in the brief quote above, he distinguishes between two forms of the 
inhuman, of which we explained only the first one. In order to address 
another source to account for the type of differentiation Stiegler aims for, 
24 Plato, Protagoras, 322 c.
25 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, tr. by Barbara Johnson, Chicago 1981, p. 149.
26 The myth is quite clear about this question and about this other source: Zeus rather 
than Prometheus, and the gods rather than the titans, offer the means to deal with the 
divine arts. Yet this solution might, of course, be interpreted as a metaphysical gesture in 
which the father-God is the measure of the distinction that is needed here.
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Lyotard refers us to the second form of the inhuman, the one by which 
humankind “were to be inhabited”. To capture where this “familiar and 
unknown guest” of the human is to be found, he refers to the exemplary 
example of education, an example which, as he writes is also “accessible to 
humanists”.27 Humans are not born human, Lyotard continues, since oth-
erwise they would not need to be educated. Stiegler’s story on the τέχναι 
given to humankind as a supplement to humans’ native lack is mirrored 
in Lyotard’s comments on education and on the institutions that make up 
human society; education allows the uneducated child to enter civiliza-
tion. Education, Bildung, or παιδεία, so central to humanist concerns, use 
a certain potentiality of the human child, but they use a potentiality that 
the human child cannot actualize by him or herself. As in the parable of the 
cave, when the prisoner is freed for the first time, he lacks the capacities to 
go out into the sun – only when he is forced by others who already have 
learnt to walk in the sunlight, the prisoner may be brought to the freedom 
Socrates envisions here. Education is a similar process in which the potenti-
alities of the child are forced in a certain direction so that the child may find 
a life in the institutions that constitute his or her society. The native lack of 
civilization (as a product of the τέχναι) is thus supplemented by education, 
as Lyotard writes: “The institutions which constitute culture supplement 
this native lack.”28 He continues by posing the following two fundamental 
questions:
What shall we call human in humans, the initial misery of their childhood [enfance], or 
their capacity to acquire a “second” nature which, thanks to language, makes them fit to 
share in communal life, adult consciousness and reason? That the second depends on and 
presupposes the first is agreed by everyone. The question is only that of knowing whether 
this dialectic, whatever name we grace it with, leaves no remainder (reste).29
If a distinction is needed to confront the disaster of which both Stiegler 
and Lyotard write, and if this distinction is to be thought out of a non-
metaphysical schema that privileges the one, and if the notion of φάρμακον 
as Stiegler thinks it does not offer the means to truly think this distinction, 
the best way to proceed might be to insist, as Lyotard does here, on the two 
humans (and the two forms of the inhuman) that are at stake in the human 
being. Since if there are two, there is at least a distinction.
Let us see how Lyotard proceeds in the above quote and how he accounts 
for the role of the native lack of the human. According to him there is a 
remainder or a reserve of human childhood that is not fully transformed 
27 Lyotard, The Inhuman, pp. 2–3.
28 Lyotard, The Inhuman, p. 3.
29 Lyotard, The Inhuman, p. 3.
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into culture’s second nature. This remainder, as Lyotard continues, explains 
why there is a constant “struggle” of the individual to “assure his or her 
conformity to the institutions” as well as for “the power of criticizing them”. 
Childhood or enfance thus refers to the child’s potentiality as a potentiality 
exceeding the actualization that education offers. This excessive dimension 
of the child’s potentiality remains in the adult. This excessive dimension is 
noticed first and foremost as a particular form of impotentiality the adult 
feels with respect to the institutions: the adult cannot naturally conform to 
the institutions. Or, as Lyotard writes in the same context, this remaining 
potentiality or this reserve is present in the experience of “the pain of sup-
porting them [i. e., the institutions]” as well as in “the temptation to escape 
them.” These descriptions each indicate that the human does not coincide 
with the second nature that education, Bildung and παιδεία have bestowed 
upon him or her. In this sense, as the particular impotentiality (ἀδυναμία) 
to identify with the given τέχναι and the given education, the native lack 
of childhood is still at work after our Bildung. This native impotentiality or 
weakness thus generates in adult life a particular reserve with respect to the 
institutions, technologies, and their powers. Reserve is meant here in the 
double sense of (1) what is held in reserve, namely a hidden potentiality to 
criticize or a “temptation to escape the institutions,” and (2) of a certain 
reservation in the human with respect to this actualization of education, 
expressed here in the pain of supporting the institutions or the struggle to 
conform to them.
It is intriguing that Lyotard names this constitutive lack childhood or 
rather infancy, enfance, that which cannot (yet) speak. Hence, the inhuman 
that inhabits the human concerns a realm in the human that precedes the 
λόγος, the human voice and human words, which after all result from the 
skill Prometheus offered to humankind. As Giorgio Agamben reminds us 
when developing a similar concept of enfance as Lyotard, the infant’s inca-
pacity to speak is not a mere lack, but rather the potentiality to speak all 
languages – a potentiality which can never be actualized.30 This means also 
that in a certain sense this potentiality exceeds the languages that the child 
actually learns to speak. This surplus in the child’s misère, in the child’s in-
capacity to speak, survives in the adult – at least this is what Lyotard claims. 
Consequently, since the education of the child is not without remainder, 
the definition of the human as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον does not capture this very 
remainder that co-constitutes the human and that implies a rift between ζωή 
and λόγος, but this time this rift is not only thematized in terms of λόγος as 
30 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History. The Destruction of Experience, tr. by Liz 
Heron, London/New York 1993, pp. 55–56.
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τέχνη, but also in the constitutive δύναμις/ἀδυναμία of this other form of 
ἄλογος, i. e., not the one of the animals that lack the potentiality to speak 
human languages, but the ἄλογος or the βάρβαρος of the infant.
It is this descending of the human that inspires Lyotard to suggest that, 
rather than taking “pride in the title of humanity” because of the human 
capacity to become a star, “one can take pride in the title of humanity for 
exactly the opposite reasons,” and he continues with the following descrip-
tion of the child:
Shorn of speech, incapable of standing upright, hesitating over the objects of its interest, 
not able to calculate its advantages, not sensitive to common reason, the child is eminently 
the human because its distress heralds and promises things possible. Its initial delay in 
humanity, which makes it the hostage of the adult community, is also what manifests to 
this community the lack of humanity it is suffering from, and which calls on it to become 
more human.31
To avoid any misunderstandings, let me emphasize that Lyotard insists 
that one cannot simply choose between the two versions of “humanism” 
sketched here  – the humanism of the human institutions, of education, 
Bildung, παιδεία, technology, science or the humanism of the infant. In this 
sense, he strongly opposes definitions, such as Jean-Paul Sartre’s, in which 
the human turns out to have no defining properties at all. The human is 
rather, for Lyotard as well as for Stiegler, this very ambiguity itself: of institu-
tion and infant. These two elements are never taken up in “a well-ordered 
dialectic”; they remain a mismatch. Moreover, by insisting on this two-
faced-ness of the human, Lyotard also claims that both sides of the human 
can turn inhuman: we have already discussed in which sense the institutions 
may become inhuman, and we may add that there is no education without 
limiting the realm of possibilities lying ready in enfance; yet, another danger 
can be found in the dimension of the infant, since in relation to the institu-
tions this impotentiality to identify with them can give rise to “an inhuman 
power of deregulation.”
Nevertheless, despite this symmetry between both sides of the human, it 
is clear that for Lyotard, in the present-day situation marked by what he calls 
a “transformation of the nature of the system” (i. e., Stiegler’s disorientation 
and Heidegger’s Gestell) that the task of philosophy is in the first place to 
draw attention to childhood, to this originary poverty and weakness of the 
human. Interestingly enough, in a terminology that he, once again, shares 
with Stiegler and which both borrow from Heidegger, Lyotard interprets 
our relation to our childhood as a debt:
31 Lyotard, The Inhuman, pp. 3–4.
Authors e-offprint with publisher’s permission.
30 Gert-Jan van der Heiden 
And what else is left to resist with but the debt which each soul has contracted with the 
miserable and admirable indetermination from which it was born and does not cease to 
be born? […] This debt to childhood [enfance] is one which we never pay off. […] It is 
the task of writing, thinking, literature, arts, to venture to bear witness to it.32
The difference and the affinity between Lyotard and Stiegler is once more 
affirmed by this notion of debt, as a reinterpretation of Heidegger’s Schul-
digsein.33 For Stiegler, human’s being-at-fault, as he translates Schuldigsein in 
order to capture the play of words with the notion of dé-faut and the double 
fault (of, first, Epimetheus’ forgetting and, subsequently, Prometheus’ theft), 
positions the debt in the first place in a forgetting of the human poverty and 
subsequently to the stolen supplement that is introduced to compensate for 
this forgetting. Yet, what Stiegler does not do, is trying to think the indebt-
edness of the human to this “poverty or misery” itself which is not only 
that which is in need of a supplement, but is also the source of resistance to 
each of the gifts of arts and fire.34 Whereas for Stiegler, the indeterminacy 
of human life is the indeterminacy of the supplement – of technics, in his 
case, or of writing, as in Derrida’s case – Lyotard argues that there is another 
indeterminacy to be found in the “familiar and unknown guest”, in the 
the infant, that accompanies the human. Precisely in light of this question 
concerning the human debt to its beginning, one might wonder whether, 
despite his effort to think the birth of humankind, Stiegler does not forget 
to think the phenomenon of the birth of the human. In this respect, it is 
quite striking that Lyotard in his reading of Arendt argues that, despite some 
of the questions he has regarding her humanism, his idea of childhood or 
enfance has a strong resonance with Arendt’s conception of birth and natali-
ty.35 As he writes:
Birth is not merely the biological fact of parturition, but, under cover and on discovery 
of this fact, the event of a possible radical alteration in the course compelling things to 
repeat the same. Childhood [Enfance] is the name of this faculty, in that it brings to the 
world of being the astonishment of what, for a moment, is nothing yet – of what is already 
without yet being something.36
32 Lyotard, The Inhuman, p. 7.
33 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 196711, pp. 280–289.
34 Jean-François Lyotard, Lectures d’enfance, Paris 1991, p. 67.
35 Cf. “Survivant”, in Lyotard, Lectures d’enfance, pp. 57–87; see especially pp. 66–
67. Lyotard is careful to note that, although he embraces Arendt’s notion of birth and 
natality, he is more hesitant concerning the humanist tendency in Arendt’s conception of 
action as the human capacity to innovate (p. 69).
36 Lyotard, Lectures d’enfance, p. 70. For the translation see, Jean-François Lyo-
tard, “The Survivor,” in Towards the Postmodern, edited and translated by Robert 
Harvey and Mark S. Roberts, New York 1999, p. 151.
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Childhood, the human misery and poverty, and the initial delay of the 
human to enter humanity, thus not only “haunts discourse” but haunts the 
supplementary structure in which the human is placed but in which the 
human is always also out of place. One might perhaps say, with respect to 
Arendt, that the faculté of enfance is not to be understood out of the human 
capacity to act or to speak but rather out of its constitutive poverty and 
misery, i. e., its intrinsic weakness.37
3. Hermeneutics and Humanism
Stiegler, as we noted above, introduces a differentiation in the meaning 
of technics – a distinction between the poisonous and medicinal side of 
τέχνη – for which the Derridean notion of φάρμακον does not seem to 
offer the proper means. By emphasizing the dimension of the infant, Lyo-
tard points out that the native lack constitutive of the human and exempli-
fied by the infant might offer a resource for thinking the distinction that 
Stiegler needs in order to find an alternative to the mere disorientation of 
modern technology. In order to show how this indeed leads in Lyotard to 
such a distinction – although perhaps not so much by invoking the sense of 
the πολιτική τέχνη, let me return briefly to the beginning, to the notions 
of Anstoß and Wagnis in Heidegger.
In another important text in which Heidegger also problematizes the 
understanding of the human as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, namely Einführung in die 
Metaphysik, he famously turns to the first choir of Sophocles’ Antigone to 
interpret the human in terms of δεινόν and its related terms. He translates 
these terms with the notion of das Unheimliche by which the human appears 
as das Unheimlichste, the most uncanny.38 In light of what we discussed in 
relation to Stiegler and Lyotard, it is interesting to see that in Heidegger’s 
quest for an alternative notion of the human also compels him to bring into 
play the notions of Machenschaft and techne.39 He then writes the following 
concerning the human:
37 For the quote, cf. Lyotard, Lectures d’enfance, p. 9.
38 Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe Band 40, 
Frankfurt am Main 1983, pp. 150, 157 ff. In this context, Derrida speaks here of Hei-
degger’s “suspicion” of this definition of the human, see Jacques Derrida, Sovereignties 
in Question. The Poetics of Paul Celan, ed. and tr. by Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen, 
New York 2005, p. 1264.
39 Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, p. 168.
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Der Gewalt-tätige, der Schaffende, der in das Un-gesagte ausrückt, in das Un-gedachte 
einbricht, der das Ungeschehene erzwingt und das Ungeschaute erscheinen macht, dieser 
Gewalt-tätige steht jederzeit im Wagnis (τόλμα, v. 371).40
Here, the human Wagnis concerns the inescapable risk attached to the 
chance of letting something – and in particular the human being – appear. 
This risk is developed and rethought by Stiegler and Lyotard. More impor-
tantly, at this moment, when bringing into play the Greek understanding of 
τέχνη in Einführung in die Metaphysik, Heidegger offers a crucial distinction 
between technics or technology on the one hand, and art (Kunst) on the 
other. In light of the astral epoch, such a distinction is essential, although 
one might, for all kinds of reasons, try to problematize this distinction.41
It is this distinction that Lyotard reiterates in his own way when address-
ing the possibility (or impossibility) of bringing the dimension of childhood 
to language. He reiterates the Heideggerian distinction because he captures 
the specific hermeneutic problem with which the notion of enfance goes 
hand in hand. How can something that cannot speak be brought to language 
as if it says something or wants to say something? Lyotard is aware that what 
cannot speak cannot simply be determined as what cannot yet speak. Even 
if we say of the infant that he or she cannot yet speak, we do not mean to 
say that, when the child grows up and learns to speak he or she would be 
able, afterwards, to speak of his or her own infancy.42 Therefore, another 
distinction needs to be made in the realm of discourse and in the realm of 
the institutions so that in this realm childhood might be traced, so that what 
“haunts discourse” is attested to in discourse – even if this means to attest 
to an absence of attestation (since the infant cannot speak). As he notes in 
the introduction to The Inhuman, the dimension of infancy is somehow at 
work in or inspires “what, in our civilization at least, passes as institutional: 
literature, the arts, philosophy”. He continues: “There too, it is a matter 
of traces of an indetermination, a childhood, persisting up to the age of 
adulthood.”43 These particular types of discourse or institution – of “writing, 
thinking, literature, arts” – are therefore entrusted with the task “to venture 
to bear witness to [infancy].” Whereas the institutions represent the first 
form of inhumanity, Lyotard adds a difference – comparable to the differ-
40 Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, p. 170.
41 For instance, what to make of the peculiar distinction Heidegger introduces when 
arguing: Kunst ist Wissen und deshalb τέχνη. Die Kunst ist nicht deshalb τέχνη, weil zu ihrem Vollbringen ‘technische’ Fertigkeiten, Werkzeuge und Werkstoffe gehören. Heidegger, Einfüh-
rung in die Metaphysik, p. 169.
42 At this point, I follow Visker’s clear analysis, cf. Rudi Visker, The Inhuman Condi-
tion. Looking for Difference after Levinas and Heidegger, Dordrecht 2004, p. 269.
43 Lyotard, The Inhuman, p. 3.
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ence between technics and art in Heidegger’s reinterpretation of τέχνη – to 
locate or to situate in the arts the capacity to bear witness to this childhood, 
to bear witness to an incapacity to speak (or as Lyotard sometimes writes, 
to “say that we cannot say it”44).
Childhood is thus the resource by which discourse transforms into bear-
ing witness. It is the task of this hermeneutic figure of bearing witness to 
remember the constitutive poverty and impotentiality of the human as the 
very resource of things possible, but also as the resource of what gives to 
think and what gives to speak. Although it may be true that λόγος and φωνή 
belong to the τέχναι, the answer to the question of why the human should 
use these skills cannot be merely found in τέχνη itself but refers us to this 
desire for potentialities and possibilities that marks the native lack of the 
human. Perhaps, to put it in other words, if one asks the question of what 
makes us speak and what makes us think, part of the answer goes as follows: 
one speaks because one is addressed, because one is asked to respond and be-
cause one is taken up in an ongoing conversation. Yet, there is also another 
Anstoß to come to speak and another Wagnis to begin to speak in the first 
place, namely the risky venture to speak out of one’s pain or struggle to sup-
port the institutions or to bring one’s temptation to escape the institutions 
to language. In these forms of speaking, the possibilities that have not been 
actualized but were nevertheless given in the poverty and impotentiality of 
childhood are brought to language. It is the hermeneutic struggle of the 
arts and of philosophy to disentangle from the ongoing discourses to bear 
witness to this reserve or remainder of the infant that makes them speak in 
the first place.
Summary
Humanism has been challenged from different sides in the last century. This essay discusses 
two important critiques of humanism that have been developed in the wake of Martin 
Heidegger’s Letter on “Humanism”, namely that of Bernard Stiegler and Jean-François 
Lyotard. Both authors argue that the human is marked by a twofold non- or pre-human 
dimension, namely a native lack of the human, which Stiegler understands as the human 
defect and which Lyotard understands in terms of the notion of enfance or childhood, and 
the capacity of the human to supplement this lack, which Stiegler understands in terms of 
technics and technology and which Lyotard understands in terms of the human capacity 
to be educated and integrated in institutions, discourses, and so on. This essay shows in 
which sense the positions of Stiegler and Lyotard are complementary and, in particular, 
how Lyotard’s reflections on childhood might offer a sense of resource that Stiegler aims 
to find in technics, but seems unable to.
44 Lyotard, The Inhuman, p. 7. Quoted in Visker, The Inhuman Condition, p. 276.
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Zusammenfassung
Der Humanismus ist im letzten Jahrhundert von verschiedenen Seiten kritisiert worden. 
In diesem Artikel werden zwei wichtige Ansätze untersucht, nämlich diejenigen von 
Bernard Stiegler und Jean-François Lyotard, die beide Heideggers Überlegungen über 
den Humanismus weiterentwickeln. Beide versuchen zu zeigen, dass der Mensch in 
zweifacher Weise von einer „nicht-menschlichen“ oder „prä-humanen“ Dimension 
bestimmt ist. Erstens gibt es die Dimension des geburtlichen Mangels, die Stiegler als 
das menschliche Defizit versteht und Lyotard als enfance oder Kindheit bezeichnet. Zwei-
tens gibt es die Dimension, in der dieser Mangel ausgeglichen wird, was Stiegler mit 
dem Vermögen der Technik verbindet und Lyotard mit Bildung als Eingliederung in 
Institutionen. In diesem Artikel wird darüber hinaus gezeigt, inwieweit die Ansichten 
von Stiegler und Lyotard als komplementär gelten können und insbesondere wie Lyotards 
Beschreibungen der Kindheit dabei helfen können, zwischen einer zerstörerischen und 
einer integrierenden Technik zu unterscheiden, was Stiegler offenkundig nicht vermag.
